G20 Chair’s Statement Isolates China on External Imbalances

Chair’s statement lacks consensus

Every G20 member present except China supported the chair’s statement issued after the August 31-September 1 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting in Asheville, North Carolina, according to the U.S. Treasury. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the result as 19 members against one, the Associated Press reported.

China’s withholding of support prevented a consensus G20 communiqué. The outcome was a nonbinding chair’s statement, which contains no coordinated tariff, subsidy, enforcement commitment, quantitative target, or deadline.

China objected to paragraphs 4, 10, 11 and 13 of the text. Paragraphs 10 and 11 address global imbalances and IMF and OECD surveillance; paragraph 4 addresses energy trade and conflicts; paragraph 13 addresses sovereign debt. China’s objections therefore covered issues beyond export policy.

The official statement refers to members present. The G20 comprises 19 countries plus the European Union and African Union, while the published statement does not identify the additional formal member absent from Bessent’s 19-to-1 count.

Surplus and deficit adjustment

The majority-backed text says economies with excessive and persistent external surpluses should remove distortions that constrain domestic consumption and create overreliance on exports. It also calls on deficit economies to increase savings and pursue fiscal consolidation.

This language places adjustment responsibilities on both surplus and deficit economies. It can therefore support scrutiny of U.S. fiscal deficits and low savings alongside scrutiny of Chinese industrial policies and domestic demand.

The statement asks the IMF and OECD for more granular analysis, improved data, and scenario modelling. Expanded surveillance could provide common measures of subsidies, domestic-demand weakness, and cross-border spillovers for later national or multilateral decisions.

Similar language appeared in the May 19 G7 finance ministers’ communiqué, which called on persistent-surplus economies to strengthen domestic demand and reduce distortions. Asheville extended that approach to a broader group of G20 participants.

China’s trade and external balances

China reported 26.989 trillion yuan in goods exports and 18.480 trillion yuan in imports in 2025, producing a record 8.509 trillion-yuan goods surplus, up 20.4% from 2024. The National Bureau of Statistics put the surplus at approximately $1.2 trillion.

China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange reported a separate 2025 current-account surplus of $735 billion. The current account and customs goods balance are different measures, with the former covering additional cross-border transactions beyond goods trade.

China’s exports to the United States fell 19.5% in 2025, while exports to ASEAN rose 14.0% and exports to the European Union rose 9.0%. The figures document a geographic reorientation of Chinese exports and support the inference that barriers in one market can redirect trade toward others.

The IMF concluded in February that weak Chinese private demand, low inflation, and real-exchange-rate depreciation contributed to strong exports. It estimated China’s 2025 current-account surplus at 3.3% of GDP before final Chinese balance-of-payments data were released.

China says it does not seek a trade surplus and attributes export growth primarily to competitiveness and innovation. China’s representative at the IMF also disputed the Fund’s assessment, citing trade restrictions, export front-loading, and limitations in the IMF model.

Whether the 19-member alignment produces common policies remains uncertain. The statement gives governments broader diplomatic support for national trade-defence measures, while requiring none, and China can still block a formal G20 agreement.